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{1}  Thank you.  It’s a pleasure to be here, and I appreciate the invitation.  What I want to talk about 
are some legal issues relating to labeling and, in particular, constitutional issues relating to mandatory 
labeling for genetically modified foods or food products that may contain genetically modified 
components.  This is a separate issue from whether or not the FDA, or some other agency, has 
sufficient statutory authority at present to mandate labeling, and that is something worth discussing.  
Even if they do have such authority, or even if Congress tomorrow were to give the FDA such 
authority or were to require the FDA to impose labels on genetically modified foods, or if a state 
sought, to impose mandatory labeling requirements on genetically modified foods as was proposed in 
Oregon, there are many reasons to wonder whether such requirements would be  held constitutional 
under the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence with regard to commercial speech.  
{2}  For some this may seem a little odd.  What do you mean the government couldn’t mandate 
labels?  Certainly, up until about thirty years ago, the idea that the government couldn’t make 
companies provide whatever information the government thought important was relatively 
widespread.1   In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that commercial speech 
is protected speech.2   It may not be as protected as political speech, but it is nonetheless subject to 
constitutional protection.  Compelled speech is also subject to the same sort of sort of constitutional 
scrutiny as restricted speech, particularly when laws or regulations compel either individuals or 
corporations to give voice to messages that may be confused with political content with which the 
speaker disagrees.3   I think that in the context of genetically modified foods, we certainly see that 
potential.  
{3}  I want to walk through what some of the red flags about mandatory labeling for genetically 
modified foods and what sorts of constitutional limits such proposals might have.  The Supreme 
Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence is, shall we say, a little bit ambiguous.  A majority of the 
current Justices have suggested that the current tests are wrong, but the Justices have yet to settle on 
a better test or different test.4  There is a case that will probably be heard this term in the Supreme 
Court,5  but certainly there is an element of tea-leave reading in all of this because the Court has not 
fully clarified the precise limits on regulation of commercial speech.  Nonetheless, there are many 
reasons to be skeptical that a government requirement that products that may contain genetically 
modified material have to bear the warning, “Contains GMOs” or “May Contain GMOs” would pass 
muster.  Such a requirement could well be struck down on constitutional grounds.  
{4}  The analysis for commercial speech initially concerns whether there is a need to protect the 
public from misleading information.6   There are all kinds of requirements that take the form of: If a 
company makes a claim, it has to qualify that claim with additional information to ensure the initial 
claim does not mislead consumers.  So for example, when certain nutritional claims are made, if the 
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FDA does not approve of those claims, the companies can be required to say so.  If a company says 
“Blueberries are good for you,” it may have to qualify the claim in a particular way, or acknowledge that 
the FDA does not approve of the claim.7   In such cases, absent the additional information, the initial 
claim is considered to be misleading.  Note that a company in this context always has the option of not 
making the initial claim.  
{5}  For the law students here, there are cases involving legal advertising.  For example, in some 
states, if a lawyer advertises that they take all cases on contingency and the lawyer only gets paid if the 
client wins, if the client could potentially be liable for court costs, lawyers are required to provide that 
information when they advertise that they take cases on a contingency basis.8   Otherwise, consumers 
could be liable for economic costs of which at they would not be aware.  The initial claim could be 
misleading.
{6}  In the GMO context, however, this analysis is not applicable because companies are not saying 
anything, so that initial justification for a requirement – to clarify a true, but otherwise misleading 
statement – is not available.  Absent that kind of justification, the government must have what is 
characterized as a substantial governmental interest to infringe upon commercial speech.9   
{7}  The sorts of substantial interests one can think of are things like unidentifiable health risks, 
an economic impact, or a physical impact on the consumer.  In all cases in which these speech 
requirements have been upheld, these are the sorts of risks that the uninformed consumer, that is risks to 
which the consumer without the information could be subject.  So, companies must disclose ingredients 
in products, because consumers may have allergies, or because consumers may be on fat-restricted 
diets or sodium-restricted diets. This sort of information can prevent a negative material impact on 
the consumer.  In the case of generic labeling for genetically modified foods, however, the question is 
whether or not that sort of interest can be asserted.  
{8}  You heard from several speakers about the conclusions of the National Academy of Sciences and 
the FDA that there is no material difference based on the technology used.10  So long as that is the 
consensus of regulatory agencies, it will be very difficult for the government to assert the potential 
health risk of GMOs as an interest justifying labeling.  Generalized consumer desire to have more 
information, may, under some interpretations, be enough to trigger FDA’s statutory authority, but it 
probably isn’t enough to satisfy the First Amendment requirements.  
{9}  In the context of genetically modified foods this, in fact, was tested in federal court. In 
International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy, the State of Vermont wanted to require milk 
producers to label milk that had come from cows that had been treated with a recombinant bovine 
growth hormone (rBGH).11   The Second Circuit Court of Appeals said Vermont can’t mandate this 
because the government did not identify any difference in the milk.  It could not identify any health 
risk, or anything else that would rise to the level of substantial governmental interest that would justify 
mandating labels on milk and requiring milk producers to provide information that they don’t want to 
provide.12 
{10}  The court said that absent this interest, there is no reasonable concern for human health or safety 
or some other sufficiently substantial governmental concern, thus manufacturers cannot be compelled 
to disclose their use of rBGH.  Consumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough state interest to sustain 
the mandatory labeling, even of a factually accurate statement.13   Even though we may be a bit more 
permissive about mandating purely factual statements, it’s not enough that  some consumers may 
care about it.  One of the reasons for this is that there is no end to the sort of things government could 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Winter 2004- Volume X, Issue 2
Food Biotechnology: A Legal Perspective- Jonathan Adler
possibly require under such a standard.14   
{11}  Even if a substantial interest is demonstrated, there still must be a fit between the speech 
mandate the label requirement and the asserted governmental interest.15   When it comes to 
genetically modified foods, briefly consider the following example.  Let’s say there is a particular 
product, a genetically modified product, that does raise the risk of allergenicity and the government 
said, “we’re worried about allergenicity so we want you to label.”  The problem is that a “May Contain 
GM Products” or “May Contain GMOs” label doesn’t have any connection to the state concern because 
there is nothing about GM technology, as such, that increases the risks of an allergic reaction. There are 
lots of products for which GM technology may have been used that pose no foreseeable potential risk 
for allergenicity.  So even where an interest is asserted, there must be some connection, though there is 
some ambiguity in the Court’s jurisprudence about how close the fit must be.  
{12}  We also know that there must be some tailoring, some effort by the governmental agency to 
make the disclosure of the labeling requirement match the concern that justifies mandating speech 
in the first place.  This leads us, I think, to question the constitutionality of a requirement to label 
foods with “Contains GMOs” or “May Contain GMOs.”  While there’s less constitutional question 
about identifying specific products or specific crosses, or specific genes where those specific genes 
produce very specific concerns requiring labeling on that basis. What about a qualified product labeling 
requirement that only applied to those products where there was reason to suspect allergenecity?  In this 
example, labeling might work for these specific instances, but across the board, it would not.  
{13}  The last thing I want to say is that the GM debate – is mostly about values and about ethical 
concerns.  This fact raises an additional red flag under the First Amendment because the Court has 
always been very sensitive to the idea that compelling an individual to give voice to a controversial 
message, or to make a statement with which they disagree, is something that the government should 
rarely be allowed to do.  Anti-GMO proposals are not about health risks, but about how we feel about 
GM technology and how our foods should be produced.  
{14}  A GMO labeling requirement would be likely to face additional scrutiny because there would be 
real suspicion that the basis for the labeling is not health concerns, but political control over the sorts 
of messages and values that we communicate in the food distribution process and in the food market 
process.  In that context, courts have made it clear that those are the sorts of debates that the government 
should stay out of and should be left to the market place of ideas.
{15}  Let me give one example how this might work.  New York State had a law about kosher labeling 
whereby New York State certified the labeling of kosher products.  The law was struck down on 
constitutional establishment of religion grounds because the State was deciding what was kosher and 
what wasn’t kosher, and that’s a religious issue.16   Someone might say “That might leave a lot of people 
in the dark because for a lot of people knowing how our food is made is incredibly important.” The 
reality, however, is that there are all kinds of religious, non-government groups that engage in kosher 
label certification of and employ various levels of stringency for kosher foods.  The consumer who cares 
can still get the information absent a government label.17 
{16}  The constitutional barrier for the government being able to mandate a particular label does not 
necessarily mean that there are other non-governmental labeling schemes which can rise up and provide 
consumers with the sort of information that they may, for very good reasons, feel that they want or need 
when they are deciding what products to buy.  
___________________________________________________________________________________
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